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Could SOX Be Better?: Exploring The Accomplishments and Shortfalls of Sarbanes-Oxley

I.Introduction
In the early 21st century, a series of corporate frauds coming to light spurred passage of
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (also referred to as the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act; Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and
Transparency Act; Sarbanes-Oxley; or SOX). The stated purpose of SOX was “[t]o protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to
the securities laws, and for other purposes” 1. In their article “The Causes and Consequences of
Accounting Fraud” Dr. Mason Gerety and Dr. Kenneth Lehn assert the following:
One of the fundamental purposes of corporate accounting is to facilitate the monitoring
of managers. Since managers are instrumental in the production of accounting numbers,
and since it is costly to monitor their behavior in this regard, firms sometimes report
fraudulent accounting numbers.2
This article was written in 1997, before the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley, and it shows why SOX
may have been necessary. The idea at the time was that corporate accountants should be the
ones who detect the fraud of their managers, not outside auditors. In addition to that idea,
much of the auditing of public companies then was done by auditors who would not be

1

United States. 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: conference report (to accompany H.R. 3763). [Washington,
D.C.]: [U.S. G.P.O.].
2
Gerety, Mason, and Kenneth Lehn. “The Causes and Consequences of Accounting Fraud.” Managerial and
Decision Economics 18, no. 7-8 (April 28, 1997): 587–99. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)10991468(199711/12)18:7/8<587::aid-mde855>3.0.co;2-r.
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considered “independent” under Title II of SOX. These variables in addition to a host of other
issues with the way public companies and their executives were held accountable lead to a
business climate that encouraged rampant fraud. This paper addresses the question “Was
Sarbanes-Oxley as effective as possible in protecting investors?”.

II. Review of SOX and Its Intentions
The goal of SOX was to protect investors from fraud perpetrated by managers of the
public companies in which they are investing. Since the only substantial information to which a
typical investor has access is the what is publicly available through EDGAR (the SEC’s Electronic
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system), it is important that the publicly available
information is accurate and faithfully reported without material misstatements. SOX mandated
several regulations to public companies to ensure that their financial position was faithfully
represented in their financial statements and supplementary data and disclosures.
Some of the key provisions of SOX include, but are not limited to, the following.
•

Section 103 authorized the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) to create rules to ensure auditor independence, the standards of which are
spelled out in Title II. This removed the industry’s right to self-regulate through the
AICPA.

•

Section 302 requires the CEO and CFO to sign the 10K and be held legally responsible for
the content therein.

•

Section 404 requires an internal control report to be included with each issuance of
financial statements. This report was to be completed by outside auditors and had to
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state management’s responsibility in implementing adequate controls as well as the
assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls system.
•

Section 806 protects whistleblowers from retaliation and Section 1107 criminalized such
retaliation. This section was expanded under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act.

•

Section 902 dictates that any person who conspires to violate any of the regulations set
out in SOX can receive the same punishments as those who violate them. This section
also discusses enhanced penalties for white-collar crimes (the specific sentences are laid
out in Section 906).3
The goal of all these regulations is to ensure that the information presented to investors

and potential investors is faithfully represented and is as accurate and comprehensive as
possible. The intent was to take a two pronged approach: to dissuade people from attempting
to commit fraud by imposing strict penalties for those who are caught and to improve the
auditing process to decrease audit risk which is “the risk that the auditor expresses an
inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated.”4

III. Predictions About SOX
The immediate response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was overwhelmingly negative.
Predictions ranged from SOX being a waste of time in daily business practice, to the Act
completely removing any incentive for a company to go public. While some critics thought that

3

4

United States, “Sarbanes-Oxley”
“Auditing Standard No. 8.” Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. PCAOB, December 15, 2010.
https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Archived/PreReorgStandards/Pages/Auditing_Standard_8.aspx.
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some provisions in SOX could help reduce fraud and increase consumer confidence, they were
still reluctant to label Sarbanes-Oxley as positive overall.
Frank Bowman III, a law professor from the Indiana University School of Law, wrote an
editorial in the Federal Sentencing Reporter about one of the downsides of SOX in April of 2003.
According to Bowman, the criminal sections of SOX were largely about optics. The public
needed to see that their government was doing something to protect them from the corporate
misconduct that appeared to be everywhere. Bowman asserts that because of this, Congress
pulled together SOX too quickly and without careful planning. In 2001, the United States
Sentencing Commission raised penalties for executives who committed fraud. SOX decided to
focus on increasing maximum penalties as well, even though the Department of Justice initially
stated that the recent increase in sentencing was adequate, and that what was really needed
were resources for investigators and prosecutors. However those resources were expensive,
and after President Bush gave a speech to Wall Street expressing the “need” for stricter
sentencing, the DOJ changed its initial assessment to back the President. Bowman says that
“[i]n the end, Sarbanes-Oxley’s criminal sections created some new niche crimes…, raised
statutory maximum sentences…, and suggested or mandated a few specific guideline changes
aimed at high-level corporate offenders.”5 Bowman did not believe that these increased
penalties would substantially decrease the amount of corporate fraud occurring and, in this
way, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was insufficient.

5

Bowman, Frank O. “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and What Came After.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 15, no. 4 (2003):
231–33. https://doi.org/10.1525/fsr.2003.15.4.231.
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There were some who took a more optimistic approach to the effectiveness of
increasing criminal penalties for white-collar crimes. Jennifer Recine argued in her 2002 article
entitled “Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act” that harsher prison sentences in SOX would be an effective deterrent to fraud. She argues
that “the more white-collar criminals who are convicted and sentenced for the crimes they
commit, the greater the deterrent effect produced by the legislation. Second, jail sentences
generally can provide some kinds of deterrence that fines cannot.”6 Her argument is essentially
that it was possible for the criminal sentencing portion of Sarbanes-Oxley to be effective in
deterring future crime, but only if the courts were willing to consistently sentence those who
commit fraud and other white-collar crimes to substantial time in prison. Otherwise, the risk of
spending time in prison is just as low as it was before SOX, and no one would be further
deterred. This does, however, point to the idea that the enhanced fines and civil penalties
would be ineffective in deterring future fraud, since Recine herself noted that fines do not have
the same psychological effect as potential incarceration. This goes hand in hand with Bowman’s
claims that the enhanced penalties of SOX were, at least largely, about public perception, not
preventing fraud.7
In his 2002 article “The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just
Might Work), Lawrence Cunningham argued that SOX was not the “sweeping reform” that it
was touted to be by Congress, the President, the media, regulatory agencies, and several others

6

Recine, Jennifer S. "Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act." The
American Criminal Law Review 39, no. 4 (Fall, 2002): 1535-1570.
https://proxy.lib.utc.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.utc.edu/docview/230344402?accountid=14767.
7
Bowman, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and What Came After”
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in the world of business. Instead, he argued, “all changes made by the Act had been discussed
among corporate governance and accounting devotees for years” 8 and that SOX was
“dominantly a federal codification of extant rules, regulations, practices, and norms.” But that
was not a bad thing necessarily in Lawrence’s view. He argued that “Incrementalism, rather
than an overhaul, may be exactly what the market and regulatory machine need[ed].”
Lawrence believed that Sarbanes-Oxley was mostly a patchwork restatement of existing
regulations, restated “with the force of federal law.” He stated, however, that SOX would
“promote the ability of those with integrity to deter (and perhaps educate) those lacking it and,
thus, provide underlying fairness on which public investors may justifiably rely and in which
they may place earned trust and confidence.” Lawrence did assert that there was one aspect of
the Act that was truly meaningful reform, and this was “the structure and funding of those who
set the standards for auditing and accounting in the United States.”
In 2004, Dr. Charlie Cullinan’s article “Enron as a symptom of audit process breakdown:
can the Sarbanes-Oxley Act cure the disease?” argued that the only ways in which SOX can help
prevent fraud are in the ways through which it enhances independence. 9 These enhancements
were implemented by the “silver bullet” of SOX: the newly structured and funded standard
setters for accounting and auditing.10 According to Cullinan,11 there are three things that must
happen in order for shareholders to be made aware of a misstatement:

8

Cunningham, Lawrence A. “The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work).”
SSRN Electronic Journal, October 15, 2002. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.337280.
9
Cullinan, Charlie. “Enron as a Symptom of Audit Process Breakdown: Can the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Cure the
Disease?” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15, no. 6-7 (November 2004): 853–64.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2003.06.007.
10
Lawrence, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn”
11
Cullinan, “Enron as a Symptom of the Audit Process Breakdown”
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1. The auditor must become aware of the problem transaction
2. The auditor must recognize that there is an issue with the transaction
3. The auditor must be willing to step in and give a less than unqualified opinion
SOX has no provisions that would enhance the chances that an auditor would be made
aware of the transaction. Because even though SOX created the PCAOB, they largely coopted
the standards of the Auditing Standards Board which would not increase the number of
transactions seen by the auditor. While requiring a larger sample of transactions could help
reduce fraud by increasing the likelihood of the auditor being made aware of the problem
transaction, Sarbanes-Oxley included no such requirement. While there is no SOX regulation
that would help with the cognitive ability facet of recognition issues, greater independence of
the auditor would help avoid one of the issues that happened at Enron (auditors providing
consulting services that carefully tip-toed around GAAP). It would also mean that the auditor
was looking at the information with fresh eyes. The third step is the main issue where SOX
could make a difference. Provisions aimed at increasing independence include restricting the
“auditor from conducting certain consulting services for their audit clients” and “requir[ing]
audit partner rotation at least once every 5 years.” These are both based on the idea that “If an
auditor were more independent of the processes and assumptions underlying the financial
statements, the auditor may have an enhanced ability to recognize problems because he or she
will be viewing the process and assumptions… with greater objectivity.” Cullinan also argued
that this greater objectivity could help auditors feel more comfortable issuing an opinion other
than an unqualified opinion since they would feel more comfortable standing up to their

9

clients. However, he still argues that SOX did not include provisions that would help auditors to
become substantially more aware of misstatements in the financial report.
Cullinan’s theory was partially based on the perceived causes of the fraud that occurred
at Enron. In 2001, Enron paid $25,000,000 to its auditor, Arthur Andersen, for auditing services.
While this in itself is not cause for concern, Enron also paid Arthur Andersen $27,000,000 in the
same year for non-auditing services.12 By post-SOX standards, this is clearly an impairment of
independence, but it was legal in 2001. It has been widely accepted that Arthur Andersen not
only overlooked certain misleading assertions in Enron’s financial statements, but they also
advised management on how to exploit loopholes in the law to mislead shareholders. While
this was never an acceptable practice (Arthur Andersen was even originally convicted of
obstruction of justice for destroying documents relating to its audit of Enron to cover up their
misdeeds, but this conviction was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court), it is not
surprising that it happened when Enron was paying one million dollars every week to Arthur
Andersen for their services.
One widespread criticism of the implementation of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was that it
would be exorbitantly costly to implement, both in terms of dollars and efficiency. Some critics
even went so far as to assert that because of the cost of SOX, “any advantages gained by going
public [would] most likely be off-set by the increased cost of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance.”13
Several CFOs also argued that SOX, and specifically Section 404, were nothing but an “efficiency

12

Hirsch, Jerry, and Thomas S Mulligan. “Safeguards Failed to Detect Warnings in Enron Debacle.” Los Angeles
Times, December 14, 2001.
13
Wilkins, J. Brent "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of Restoring Shareholder Confidence,"
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 29, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 339-360
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tax” that slowed productivity. In a survey by PWC conducted in 2003, only nine percent of the
executives that responded said that they believed Sarbanes-Oxley was a good law, and only half
of them believed that SOX would increase investor confidence.14 If that were to be the case,
then it makes sense why a large segment of the general public believed the act was not going to
be worth the cost.

IV. Efficacy of SOX
Sarbanes-Oxley was written and passed as a response to a series of high profile
corporate frauds commonly referred to as the Big Four Frauds: Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest,
and WorldCom. However these were by no means the only frauds of the era, once public
attention was drawn to the issues of accounting and corporate fraud, several other stories that
“had been buried in the business section of top newspapers for years […] became front page
news everywhere and feature stories on broadcast and cable television shows.”15 There was
clearly a business landscape in the US that fostered fraud to some extent, or at least failed to
curtail it.
Eliminating all fraud in public companies with absolute certainty is impossible, and it
was never the intent of Sarbanes-Oxley, so to judge it by that metric is unfair. The goal of any
regulation is to reduce the unwanted behavior to an acceptable level. Since the amount
deemed an “acceptable level” could reasonably vary significantly for each individual, the real
question to determine the efficacy of Sarbanes-Oxley to reduce fraud becomes “Do the

14 Yoon, Lisa. "Sarbanes-Oxley Increases Risks, Costs." CFO.Com (Mar 25, 2003): 1.
https://proxy.lib.utc.edu/login?url=https://www-proquestcom.proxy.lib.utc.edu/docview/200854870?accountid=14767.
15
Lawrence, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn”
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provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley reduce fraud to the greatest extent possible without increasing
compliance costs?”. 16 There are two ways that SOX sought to significantly reduce corporate
fraud: increasing penalties for white-collar crime to deter others and imposing new standards
around auditing designed to decrease the chance that any material misstatements in the
financial statements goes unnoticed or unreported by the auditing team.

A. New Sentencing Guidelines as a Deterrent to Corporate Fraud
Sections 302 and 902 of Sarbanes-Oxley listed in section II of this paper are intended to
deter people from committing corporate fraud. Section 302 requires the CEO and CFO of a
public company to sign the 10K which holds them legally responsible for the information
therein. Section 902 states that any person involved in a conspiracy to commit fraud can be
held liable for the actions of every person in a conspiracy. This discourages people from coming
close to fraud, even if they do not technically commit any other crime besides conspiring to
commit fraud. This section also discusses the white-collar crime penalty enhancements (the
specific penalties are discussed more in depth in Section 906).17
The first factor to consider when examining the effectiveness of the increased penalties
as a deterrent is whether executives prosecuted for fraud in the early to mid-2000s were held
accountable. As Recine argued, the only way for the criminal provisions in SOX to act as a
deterrent to fraud, those who commit fraud must be consistently sentenced to time in prison.18
In her 2006 article “In Enron’s Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial,” Kathleen Brickey breaks

16

To answer this question, any improvements discussed have been theorized or found not to increase
implementation costs for companies.
17
United States, “Sarbanes-Oxley”
18
Recine, “Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”
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down the cases of seventeen companies19 that were accused of participating in corporate
fraud, wherein seventeen companies, “between March 2002 and July 2004, charges against
eighty-seven defendants were resolved.”20 Of the eighty-seven defendants whose charges had
been resolved, seventy-three had pled guilty (sixty-eight of whom became cooperating
witnesses in the cases against their colleagues), eight were convicted, four were acquitted, two
had a hung jury, and two were dismissed. While this study began before the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, it is still relevant to Recine’s argument. She states that the criminal sentencing
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley acting as a deterrent to corporate fraud are dependent upon
white-collar criminals being convicted and going to prison for the crimes they committed.21 The
initial wave of defendants having a conviction rate of over ninety percent certainly fulfills the
stipulation that those who commit fraud be convicted.
By January 31, 2006 (the end of Brickey’s study), there were twenty-three convictions by
jury and five defendants had entered a guilty plea without a cooperating agreement with
investigators.22 Notably absent from this group are Enron’s Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling since
their trials were still underway as of January 31, 2006 (they were both convicted on May 25,
200623), however due to their significance in the discussion of corporate fraud in the early

19

These companies are Adelphia Communications Corp., Cendant Corporation, CSFB, Duke Energy North America
LLC., Dynegy Inc., Enron Corporation, HealthSouth Corp., ImClone Systems Inc., Impath Inc., McKesson HBOC,
NewCom Group, Ogilvy & Mather LLP, Qwest Corporation, Rite Aid Corporation, Tyco International plc, Westar
Energy Inc, and WorldCom
20
Brickey, Kathleen F. "In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial." The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology (1973-) 96, no. 2 (2006): 397-433. Accessed September 18, 2019.
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.utc.edu/stable/40042771.
21
Recine, “Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”
22
Brickey, “In Enron’s Wake.” Those who entered a guilty plea with a Cooperating Agreement are not included in
the analysis of sentencing as their sentences are not based solely on the magnitude of the crimes they committed.
23
Sunseri, Gina, and Sylvie Rottman. “Enron Verdict: Ken Lay Guilty on All Counts, Skilling on 19 Counts.” ABC
News, May 26, 2006.
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twenty-first century, they will be included in the analysis of sentencing in this section. Twentyeight of thirty defendants mentioned were sentenced (the Arthur Andersen verdict was over
turned by the supreme court, and Ken Lay died on July 5, 2006 before he was sentenced24). Of
those twenty-eight, all of them were sentenced to prison time.25
Of those convicted by a jury, the shortest prison terms were five months which were
given to Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic in relation to insider trading of ImClone securities.
Stewart was convicted of Conspiracy, False Statements, Obstruction of Justice, and Securities
Fraud. Bacanovic was convicted of Conspiracy, False Statements, Making and Using False
Documents, Perjury, and Obstruction of Justice. The longest prison sentence was a 25 year
sentence given to WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers. Ebbers was convicted of Conspiracy,
Securities Fraud, and Making False Filings with the SEC. The average sentence for those
convicted by a jury was approximately nine years and two months, and the median sentence
was eight years.
Of those who entered a guilty plea (without a Cooperating Agreement), the shortest
prison term was three months which was given to Anu Saad, the former Chairman and CEO of
Impath, who plead guilty to Conspiracy, Securities Fraud, and Making False Filings with the SEC.
The longest prison sentence was seven years and three months which was imposed upon Sam
Waksal, the founder of ImClone, who plead guilty to Conspiracy, Fraud, and Perjury. The

24

Peters, Jeremy W., and Simon Romero. “Enron Founder Dies Before Sentencing.” The New York Times, July 5,
2006.
25
Brickey, “In Enron’s Wake.” Many of the sentences also included fines, restitution, probation, or home
detention. However since Recine’s article argues increased penalties may deter fraud only if the sentence is time in
prison, those facets of any sentences other than time in prison will not be considered.

14

average sentence for those who plead guilty (without a Cooperating Agreement) was
approximately three years and four months, and the median sentence was two years.
According to Recine’s claim that “the more white-collar criminals who are convicted and
sentenced for the crimes they commit, the greater the deterrent effect produced by the
legislation,”26 the convictions and sentences including jail time of the executives in Brickey’s
study would seem to indicate that fraud would have dropped drastically as a result of this
deterrent post Sarbanes-Oxley. However, the 2008 article “Go Directly to Jail: White Collar
Sentencing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” from the Harvard Law Review argues that there are
further requirements for criminal sentencing to act as an effective deterrent to white-collar
crime.27 The article states that “[d]eterrence works best when punishment is swift and certain.
White-collar sentencing in the years since Sarbanes-Oxley, however, has been anything but.”
The article argues that, “rather than acting upon the base Guidelines28 and average sentences
for white-collar crime, the bill simply increased the maximum sentence, thereby expanding the
range within which judges may sentence. An expanded range, without a rubric for sentencing
within that range, invites unfair disparity between sentences for similarly situated offenders.”
This all but removes any level certainty about punishment as “[a]n individual who contemplates
committing a crime has no way of predicting whether he will face ten, twenty, or more years in
prison, or receive merely a slap on the wrist for his actions.” With the aspect of certainty
removed from sentencing, the penalty enhancements for white-collar crimes would not be an

26

Recine, “Examination of the While Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”
"Go Directly to Jail: White Collar Sentencing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act." Harvard Law Review 122, no. 6
(2009): 1728-749. Accessed October 18, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40379766.
28
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
27
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effective deterrent according to this article. The Harvard Law Review article also argues that
this point is supported by the rise in section 2B1.1-crime sentencings between 2002 and 2007,
saying that these are the exact crimes that were supposed to be deterred by stricter sentencing
in SOX. However, section 2B1.1 crimes include “Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud
Offenses”29 which includes several crimes not mentioned in Sarbanes-Oxley, and it does not
include insider trading (found in section 2B1.4), which is a white-collar crime that violates SOX
Section 807. Additionally, their evidence only includes how many people were sentenced in
relation to this type of crime. This notably ignores those who were committing white-collar
crimes in 2002 that were not caught. In addition to enhanced criminal penalties, SarbanesOxley put into place regulations to enhance auditing. If those were effective, then it would
stand to reason that there were fewer cases of undetected fraud in 2007 than there were in
2002. If fewer cases in 2007 were undetected, the it is possible for the deterrent to have
worked and still have more people sentenced for those crimes. While it is possible that the
upward trend in section 2B1.1 sentencings since Sarbanes-Oxley could be in part due to
decreased certainty in white-collar sentencing, it is unfair to conclude that the increased
maximum penalties and the consistent sentences including jail time30 “are not deterring the
kind of criminal activity that the [Act] was enacted to prevent.”31

B. Increased Effectiveness of Auditors
As noted earlier, there are three key provisions that exist in order to increase the
effectiveness of the auditing process. SOX Section 103 created the PCAOB which imposes

29

“Sourcebook 2019.” United States Sentencing Commission, June 12, 2020.
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2019.
30
Brickey, “In Enron’s Wake”
31
“Go Directly to Jail”
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“Auditing Standards, Ethics and Independence Rules, Quality Control Standards”32 and more.
Section 404 required for auditors to issue a report of a company’s internal controls along with
their audit of the financial statements. Because of this, corporations are required to document
their internal controls, and auditors are able to use their assessment of the internal controls of
a company to inform how they should conduct the audit of the financial statements as weak
internal controls can be a warning sign for potential material misstatements in the financial
statements. Section 806 details whistleblower protections which encourage people to come
forward about fraud occurring in their company.
There is not an expectation of an auditor to provide a complete guarantee that all
financial statements are completely free from fraud and error. An unqualified opinion from an
auditor only provides reasonable assurance that there are no material misstatements in the
financial statements due to either error or fraud. As stated in Cullinan’s article, SOX did not
have any provisions whatsoever that increased the likelihood of an auditor becoming aware of
any problem transactions.33 He argues that the only way to guarantee that the auditor would
become aware of any problem transactions is to have them examine every single transaction
that took place over the auditing period. This is currently an unrealistic standard that would
undoubtedly raise compliance costs and would make it impossible for the audit to be
completed in the time allotted, which is between 60 and 90 days from the end of the
company’s fiscal year based on the cost of outstanding shares of stock.34 According to Cullinan,

32

“Protecting Investors through Audit Oversight.” PCAOB, 2003. https://pcaobus.org/.
Cullinan, “Enron as a Symptom of the Audit Process Breakdown”
34
SEC. “Form 10K: Fast Answers.” SEC.gov, June 26, 2009. https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform10khtm.html.
33
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this leaves two possible places where fraud can be reduced: recognizing a problem transaction
as a problem, and reporting any realized problem transactions.35 He argues that the only way
that SOX improved either of these is through the ways it increased auditor independence
(Section 103 and Title II). However, internal controls and whistleblower protections and awards
can also help to meaningfully reduce fraud.
Section 806 made it a crime to retaliate against whistleblowers who worked in public
companies, subsidiaries of public companies, and nationally recognized statistical ratings
organizations.36 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act amended
Sarbanes-Oxley to extend the same protections to employees of privately held companies, as
well as started the SEC Whistleblower Program which gives financial incentives to
whistleblowers.37 While the extension to private companies does not affect corporate fraud at
public companies, the SEC’s whistleblower program absolutely does.38 Since its inception in
2012, the SEC whistleblower program has “awarded almost $562 million to 106 individuals.”39
The fiscal year 202040 set the record for most individual whistleblowers as well as highest dollar
payout with “39 individual awards of approximately $175 million.”41 An increased number of

35

Cullinan, “Enron as a Symptom of the Audit Process Breakdown”
United States, “Sarbanes-Oxley”
37
“Whistleblower Program.” Dodd-Frank Act Rulemaking: Whistleblower Program. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2011. https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/whistleblower.shtml.
38
While not originally included in SOX, the Act was amended by Dodd-Frank which means that this is the current
way that Sarbanes-Oxley is enforced.
39
“SEC Whistleblower Program Ends Record-Setting Fiscal Year With Four Additional Awards.” Securities and
Exchange Commission. SEC, September 30, 2020. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-240.
40
October 2019 – September 2020
41
Award dollar amounts are significant as the amount of the award is tied to the severity of the fraud. See “SEC
Whistleblower Program Ends Record-Setting Fiscal Year With Four Additional Awards.”
36
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whistleblowers unquestionably increases the amount of detected fraud occurring and can also
act as an effective deterrent.
SOX Section 404 is also meant to prevent material misstatements, and it was effective in
mitigating some of the pervasiveness of financial statements issued with material
misstatements. Albert Nagy’s 2010 article “Section 404 Compliance and Financial Reporting
Quality” details a statistical study conducted by Nagy in which “results show a negative
association between S404 [sic] compliance and the issuance of materially misstated financial
statements.”42 Essentially, the companies that complied with Section 404 were less likely to
have material misstatements on their financial statements. By requiring the internal controls
system to be audited by an external auditor, the quality of internal controls should improve. In
theory, a strong system of internal controls would deter, prevent, or detect any transactions
that are misstated due to either error or fraud. However, many people argue that Section 404
fails to emphasize the most important facets of strong internal controls, and that it could be
much more effective. Section 404 has faced scrutiny since its inception for being control-based
versus risk-based. In their article “Preventing the next Wave of Unreliable Financial Reporting:
Why US Congress Should Amend Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,” Tim Leech and Lauren
Leech call for an amendment from congress to require an opinion from management and the
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external auditor on the “effectiveness of risk management processes” rather than “control
effectiveness.” 43
Section 404 was first imposed by the PCAOB in Auditing Standard No. 2 which focused
on documenting and testing controls, rather than optimizing the system to reduce the risk of
material misstatements. Auditing Standard No. 2 was ineffective and much more costly than
the SEC originally predicted, so it was replaced with Auditing Standard No. 544 (also referred to
as “AS5”) which was supposed to incorporate a more risk-based approach. However, many
critics assert that AS5 did not do enough to move from a control-based approach to a riskbased approach.45 Even though AS5 states that the auditors evaluation of internal controls is to
be made based on the assessment of risk, Leech and Leech argue that in order to move to a
true risk-based approach, “the risks that statistically have been at the root of materially wrong
financial statements over the past 50 years [must] be identified and assessed, as well as
statistically probable risks… relevant to a company’s specific business sector and personal
accounting restatement history.” After the statistically highest risks are determined,
management and external auditors should be required to “evaluate the likely effectiveness of
the current ‘risk treatments’… in place to mitigate the statistically most dangerous risks to
reliable financial disclosures.” AS5 required neither of these. Theoretically, this true risk-based
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approach would decrease the number of misstatements on the financial statements even
before they are reviewed by the auditor, as the company is mitigating much of the risk of
material misstatement on its own. This also allows the auditor to focus their time and resources
on the parts of the business most likely to be misstated for that individual business, which
reduces waste in auditing by not requiring so much of the auditor’s time and resources to be
directed toward aspects of the business that are low risk. So while Section 404 has reduced the
number of materially misstated financial statements for public companies, it could be far more
effective at doing so.

V. Cost of SOX
At the time of implementation, many critics of SOX predicted that the cost of
implementation would place an undue burden on companies, with some even predicting that
the costs would erase any benefits of going public.46 The question to determine the costeffectiveness of SOX is the inverse of the question to determine its efficacy: “Is the cost of
implementing Sarbanes-Oxley as low as possible without reducing effectiveness?”.
The most pervasive complaint about Section 404 is not its effectiveness, but its high cost
of implementation. When Section 404 was implemented, the SEC predicted that first year costs
for the average public company would be $91,000,47 but a study conducted by the consulting
group Charles River Associates found that the actual average first year implementation cost of
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Section 404 among public companies was $5.9 million,48 roughly sixty-five times what the SEC
had predicted. These costs did come down after the first year of implementation to an average
of $2.87 million per company right before AS5 replaced AS2, and then again to $2.33 million the
year after that reform,49 but even $2.33 million is over twenty-five times the amount the SEC
estimated for initial implementation. Leech and Leech argue that shifting to a risk-based model
would not only improve effectiveness of Section 404, but would also decrease the costs of
compliance.50 Currently, Section 404 forces companies to document and verify the
effectiveness of their internal controls related to all aspects of their business whether or not
they represent a significant risk of material misstatement. Under a risk-based approach, the
management and auditor would be able to focus on the areas that present the highest risk of
material misstatement while using less time and resources on the lower risk aspects of the
business, which Leech and Leech argue would not hurt the effectiveness of Section 404 at all,
but could actually improve it. Determining the statistically most likely risks based on the
company and industry could be more costly up front, but is likely to substantially lower the cost
of compliance, audit fees, and the man hours taken to fully comply with an updated Section
404.
The costs faced by companies related to SOX compliance is not measured only in dollars
and man hours. The article “Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking” by Leonce L. Bargeron,
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Kenneth M. Lehn, and Chad J. Zutter argues that the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley reduced
corporate risk-taking51 among public companies in the United States.52 Bargeron, Lehn, and
Zutter conducted a study which compared risk taking behavior53 in US and non-US corporations
before and after SOX and found that risk taking behavior declined in US firms, but not in the
non-US firms which were not subject to SOX.54 The authors assert that this decline can be
attributed to three provisions of SOX: the provision regarding board structure (Sections 301 and
407), Sections 302 and 906, and Section 404. Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the majority of the
board of directors be independent of the business, and encourages that one member of the
audit committee be judged a “financial expert.” One of the authors of the article, Kenneth Lehn,
conducted another study that found that an inverse relationship between risk taking behavior
and the proportion of independent directors on the board.55
Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter also attribute part of the decline in corporate risk taking post
SOX to Section 302 which held management legally responsible for the contents of the financial
statements and Section 906 which increased maximum sentences for managers who knowingly
and/or willfully sign financial statements containing material misstatements. While these
sections were meant to act as a deterrent to fraud, “the increase in expected penalties for
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fraud under SOX is expected to reduce the incentives of officers and directors to initiate and
approve risky projects.” 56 Section 404 compliance is most expensive for businesses that are
considered more complex (which includes having more risk taking behavior such as high
research and development costs), so reducing the appearance of riskiness in a company can
lower their costs. This leaves management to decide between higher compliance costs and less
risk taking, and it appears that most managers are deciding to take fewer risks.
Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter clarify that they are not making a judgement “as to whether
the reduction in risk-taking after SOX is socially efficient,” but they do argue that since,
presumably, “average firms adopted value-maximizing governance structures before SOX…,
then the changes in risk-taking induced by SOX are inefficient.” Essentially, businesses were
already balancing the amount of risk assumed to achieve the maximum value, so a SOX-induced
decrease in risk would be moving away from the strategy each company had adopted to
achieve the highest possible value and return for shareholders.
As for the reorganization of the board of directors to include more independent
directors, this should only ensure that management takes risks to benefit the shareholder,
which should not lower the overall amount of risk. As long as management has sufficient cause
to believe that the risks they take and the strategy they put in place will pay off for
shareholders, then a higher proportion of independent auditors should not curb that behavior.
Because independent directors would only reduce risk-taking that would reasonably be
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considered harmful to investors and improve management accountability, this is not an issue
that needs to be fixed.
In regards to Sections 302 and 906, while they do expand penalties for management
participating in fraud, they do not provide legal consequences for poor business decisions. So
once again, this would only curb risk-taking behavior that can be reasonably determined to
likely harm shareholders.
The provision that could be changed to improve this issue is Section 404, and the
solution, again, is the move to a risk-based approach. Having management and auditors focus
on the facets of the business that are statistically most likely to produce a material
misstatement instead of just the parts that appear the most complicated would remove some
of the pressure on management when making decisions regarding risk-taking behaviors. The
increases in risky endeavors would not necessarily increase their audit fees and compliance
costs because it would not change the areas of the business that are statistically the most likely
to produce a material misstatement.

VI. Conclusion
The intent of Sarbanes-Oxley was to protect investors by making disclosures from
companies more reliable and accurate,57 but protecting investors also includes not placing an
undue burden of cost on public companies since that burden is passed on to the investors. It
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would be difficult and unwise to argue that SOX did nothing to help protect investors, however
it would also be unwise to state that it does not need improvements.
Sarbanes-Oxley’s most positive impact comes from Section 103 (and subsequently Title
II) which authorized the PCAOB to impose new standards requiring auditor independence.
These rules prevent a repeat of the situation between Enron and Arthur Andersen. A company
paying millions of dollars in consulting fees to the same firm that is their auditor is unheard of
in the post-SOX world. Having an auditor who lacked independence had such an obvious
potential to impair the judgement of the auditor in their work that it is hard to believe that it
used to be an accepted practice. SOX was incredibly effective in increasing auditor
independence through its establishment of the PCAOB which denied the accounting industry
the right to almost entirely self-regulate.
In order to increase the effectiveness and reduce compliance costs of SOX, two sections
of the act need to be amended: Section 906 and Section 404. Section 806, which protected
whistleblowers, decreased the amount of undetected fraud since its implementation (and even
more so since its subsequent enhancements in Dodd-Frank), and Section 302 was effective in
holding management legally responsible for the content of the financial statements, but getting
caught and being legally responsible do not inherently deter fraud if there are not
consequences that are “swift and certain.”58 906 raised maximum criminal penalties for whitecollar crimes, but did nothing to affect minimum sentences or standardize sentencing based on
the severity of the crime. This resulted in a wider range of possible punishments for those

58

“Go Directly to Jail”

26

convicted of white-collar crimes which only decreases certainty of what punishment a potential
white-collar criminal would receive for their crimes. This certainty is a vital part of the deterrent
effect of criminal penalties. By amending section 906 to include minimum sentences for those
convicted of white-collar crimes as well as a progressive sentencing structure based on the
severity of the crime, the section would act as a much more effective deterrent to fraud and
other white-collar offenses. Moreover, this change would not put any more of a tax or
compliance burden on public companies or their investors.
An amendment to Section 404 to shift from judging control effectiveness to judging risk
management effectiveness would increase the effectiveness SOX and lower compliance costs
and auditing fees. By focusing on the most likely aspects of a business to produce material
misstatements, strong risk management systems would reduce material misstatements better
than internal controls which are not currently tailored to an individual industry or company. It
would also eliminate the cost of management assessing and documenting internal control
procedures that are not valuable to the shareholder, and would eliminate time wasted by the
auditor investigating low risk areas of the business. Were these amendments to be enacted,
Sarbanes-Oxley would be much more effective in achieving its goal to protect investors.
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